Common Sense Trumps Analytics

Tell me if you've heard this before: a coach goes for it on 4th-and-short early in a tight game, in his own territory; fails; and the announcers say something along the lines of, "It was the right call. Don't judge the coach on the results; judge him on the decision. It's what the analytics said to do. He's just going by the book."

"Analytics" has become like the Bible in football - a supposedly infallible guide, which continually gets edited; interpreted; and used as a perfect excuse if things should somehow go awry: "Hey, it's what the Bible said to do!" In other words, it's just laziness of the human mind and unwillingness to critically-think and take responsibility for one's own actions: "It's not my fault! It was the analytics!"

Newsflash: common sense trumps analytics. This past weekend, when the Los Angeles Chargers trailed the Baltimore Ravens 14-0, 1st-year Chargers head coach Brandon Staley decided to go for it on 4th-and-short inside his own 30-yard-line. Apparently, the "analytics" said going for it would have increased his team's odds of winning from something like 2% to 3%. In other words, the Chargers supposedly went from a 98% chance of losing to a 97% chance. Either way, that's, eh, what are the kids saying nowadays? Not good. I've got some analytics of my own to share, however. In the NFL, when a team starts a possession at their own 30-yard-line, they score roughly 40% of the time. When they start from their opponents' 30-yard-line, however, they score approximately 80% of the time. So, in other words, even if the Chargers had converted the aforementioned 4th down, they had just a 2 in 5 chance of scoring even a field goal on the drive, which would have cut the lead to 11. On the flip-side, if they didn't convert, there was a 4 in 5 chance Baltimore would extend the lead to three possessions on their ensuing drive. So, I don't care what the "analytics" say. Common sense and simple math tell a completely different narrative: going for it on 4th down in such a situation decreases a team's odds of winning quite significantly.

Machismo trumps logic among many coaches. Just a couple of weeks ago, Nebraska started their game against Michigan with a strong drive. They drove it inside the Michigan 10-yard-line, before they were set up with a 4th-and-short. The Wolverines had yet to trail the entire season, but what did Huskers head coach Scott Frost decide to do? Go for it. The conversion attempt failed, and Michigan went on to control the first half and eventually win the game. Why? Why not take the points? In college football this season, the team who has scored first (whether it be a touchdown, field goal, or safety) has won close to 75% of the time. That's not a typo.  The teams who have scored first have gone 357-121 this season, for a winning percentage of .747. Sure, touchdowns are preferable to field goals, but if a team has a chance to take the lead, you take the points and place the pressure on your opponent. Period. Instead of Nebraska opening with the lead in front of a packed and fiery home crowd, they handed any semblance of momentum to Michigan, who then turned it into a 13-point halftime lead. This damaged the team's morale; quieted down the home crowd; and instilled confidence in the Wolverines' defense.

On Thursday night football a couple of weeks ago, the Jacksonville Jaguars led the Cincinnati Bengals by the score of 14-0 late in the 2nd quarter. The Jags then faced a 4th-and-short inside the Bengals' 5-yard-line, and instead of taking a 17-point lead into the half, Urban Meyer decided to go for it, and fell short. Again, it's simple math: 14 points is a two-possession game, while 17 is a three-possession contest. Each drive averages 2.5 minutes per, so the more possessions a team leads by, the more difficult it is for the opposition to catch them. This failed conversion provided the Bengals with just the spark they needed entering halftime. They'd eventually win the game - yes, by 3.

"Analytics" may be useful in a sport like baseball, where you're essentially measuring the odds of one pitcher vs. one batter. Football is entirely different. It's 11-on-11. You have to take into account injuries, weather, game trends/momentum, the crowd, etc. If a single lineman misses a block, the play could be dead on arrival. This is why I love football - it's the ultimate team sport. Given that, though, if one out of eleven players fails in their responsibility on a play, it may not matter what the other ten do; the play could very well be a bust. So, in my opinion, analytics are fairly useless in football (when it comes to in-game strategy). In the aforementioned decision made by Brandon Staley, it should be common sense to not look at it from the perspective of, "Oh, this guide tells me going for it will increase the odds of us winning from 2% to 3%," but from the perspective of, "What are the potential risks and benefits of both going for it and punting, and which outweighs the other?" In this particular situation, as noted, there isn't much potential benefit in going for it from inside your own 30, down two touchdowns early in a game. Even if it's converted, there's just a 2 in 5 chance the team will score a field goal or a touchdown. On the other hand, if the conversion attempt fails, there's a 4 in 5 chance your opponent will score and expand the two-possession lead to three possessions. Also, when a team punts the football from their own 30, the odds are fairly good your opponent will start their possession inside their own 20-yard-line - of which there's just a 30% chance of scoring. This isn't even taking into account the possibilities of a muffed punt or another type of turnover from inside your opponent's territory. Much more good can happen from punting the ball in this situation than going for it.

I get it; we, as fans, want teams to go for it. We want that do-or-die adrenaline that comes with these risky moves. It's easy for the armchair quarterbacks to tell coaches to go for it on each and every 4th down. Logically speaking, though, that's just not smart. While there is such a thing as playing so conservatively, you leave yourself susceptible to losing, there's also such a thing as being too aggressive. While I tire of hearing the football-to-poker comparisons, I'll attempt to play along, in order to better prove my point to the increasing always-go-for-it crowd. When you aren't provided good hands to start the game, is it a strategically good idea to go all-in on the third hand, when you've got roughly a 50-50 chance of losing everything? No, of course not. Sometimes the calls and bounces don't go a team's way early on, but as long as they stay in the game, they've got a chance. If they go all-in early on, however, and fail, then chances are they'll be out of chips and forced to go home with their tail between their legs in short-order. If you've got a royal flush, go for it, but if you've got nothing, it's best to fold and wait for the next hand. Once again, common sense.